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Abstract. We present three attacks on the Prime Power RSA with mod-
ulus N = prq. In the first attack, we consider a public exponent e sat-
isfying an equation ex − φ(N)y = z where φ(N) = pr−1(p − 1)(q − 1).
We show that one can factor N if the parameters |x| and |z| satisfy
|xz| < N
r(r−1)
(r+1)2 thereby extending the recent results of Sakar [16]. In
the second attack, we consider two public exponents e1 and e2 and their
corresponding private exponents d1 and d2. We show that one can fac-
tor N when d1 and d2 share a suitable amount of their most significant
bits, that is |d1 − d2| < N
r(r−1)
(r+1)2 . The third attack enables us to fac-
tor two Prime Power RSA moduli N1 = p
r
1q1 and N2 = p
r
2q2 when p1
and p2 share a suitable amount of their most significant bits, namely,
|p1 − p2| < p12rq1q2 .
Keywords: RSA, Cryptanalysis, Factorization, Coppersmith’s method, Prime
Power RSA
1 Introduction
The RSA public-key cryptosystem, invented in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adle-
man [15], is one of the most popular systems in use today. In the RSA cryp-
tosystem, the public key is (N, e) where the modulus N = pq is a product of two
primes of the same bitsize, and the public exponent is a positive integer satisfy-
ing ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)). In RSA, encryption and decryption require executing
heavy exponential multiplications modulo the large integer N . To reduce the
decryption time, one may be tempted to use a small private exponent d. How-
ever, in 1990 Wiener [18] showed that RSA is insecure if d < 13N
0.25, and Boneh
and Durfee [2] improved the bound to d < N0.292. In 2004, Blo¨mer and May [1]
combined both Wiener’s method and Boneh and Durfee’s method to show that
RSA is insecure if the public exponent e satisfies an equation ex + y = kφ(N)
with x < 13N
1
4 and |y| ≤ N− 34 ex.
? Partially supported by the French SIMPATIC (SIM and PAiring Theory for Infor-
mation and Communications security).
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Concurrent to these efforts, many RSA variants have been proposed in order
to ensure computational efficiency while maintaining the acceptable levels of
security. One such important variant is the Prime Power RSA. In Prime Power
RSA the modulus N is in the form N = prq for r ≥ 2. In [17], Takagi showed
how to use the Prime Power RSA to speed up the decryption process when the
public and private exponents satisfy an equation ed ≡ 1 (mod (p − 1)(q − 1)).
As in the standard RSA cryptosystem, the security of the Prime Power RSA
depends on the difficulty of factoring integers of the form N = prq.
Therefore, a Prime Power RSA modulus must be appropriately chosen, since
it has to resist factoring algorithms such as the Number Field Sieve [10] and the
Elliptic Curve Method [9]. Table 1, shows the suggested secure Power RSA forms
as a function of the size of the modulus back in 2002 (see [4]). Note that, due
to the ever increasing development of computing hardware, the form N = p2q is
no longer recommended for 1024 bit modulus.
Modulus size (bits) 1024 1536 2048 3072 4096 8192
Form of the modulus N pq, p2q pq, p2q pq, p2q pq, p2q pq, p2q, p3q pq, p2q, p3q, p4q
Table 1. Optimal number of prime factors of a Prime Power RSA modulus [4].
In 1999, Boneh, Durfee, and Howgrave-Graham [3] presented a method for
factoring N = prq when r is large. Furthermore, Takagi [17] proved that one
can factor N if d < N
1
2(r+1) , and May [13] improved the bound to d < N
r
(r+1)2
or d < N
(r−1)2
(r+1)2 . Very recently, Lu, Zhang and Lin [12] improved the bound to
d < N
r(r−1)
(r+1)2 , and Sarkar [16] improved the bound for N = p2q to d < N0.395
and gave explicit bounds for r = 3, 4, 5.
In this paper, we focus on the Prime Power RSA with a modulus N = prq,
and present three new attacks: In the first attack we consider a public exponent
e satisfying an equation ex − φ(N)y = z where x and y are positive integers.
Using a recent result of Lu, Zhang and Lin [12], we show that one can factor N in
polynomial time if |xz| < N
r(r−1)
(r+1)2 . In the standard situation z = 1, the condition
becomes d = x < N
r(r−1)
(r+1)2 which improves the bound of May [13] for r ≥ 3 and
retrieves the bound of Lu, Zhang and Lin [12]. Note that unlike Sarkar [16] who
solves ex− φ(N)y = 1, we solve a more general equation ex− φ(N)y = z. This
leads to less constraints on the solution space, which in turn leads to an increase
in the number of solutions to the equation. Intuitively speaking, our method has
higher likelihood of finding solutions; that is, factoring RSA. In section 3, we
shall present an example supporting this claim.
In the second attack, we consider an instance of the Prime Power RSA with
modulus N = prq. We show that one can factor N if two private keys d1 and d2
share an amount of their most significant bits, that is if |d1−d2| is small enough.
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More precisely, we show that if |d1 − d2| < N
r(r−1)
(r+1)2 , then N can be factored in
polynomial time. The method we present is based on a recent result of [12] with
Coppersmith’s method for solving an univariate linear equation.
In the third attack, we consider two instances of the Prime Power RSA with
two moduli N1 = p
r
1q1 and N2 = p
r
2q2 such that the prime factors p1 and p2
share an amount of their most significant bits, that is |p1 − p2| is small. More
precisely, we show that one can factor the RSA moduli N1 and N2 in polynomial
time if |p1 − p2| < p12rq1q2 . The method we use for this attack is based on the
continued fraction algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly review
the preliminaries necessary for the attacks, namely Coppersmith’s technique
for solving linear equations and the continued fractions theorem. In Section 3,
we present the first attack on the Prime Power RSA, which is valid with no
conditions on the prime factors. In Section 4, we present the second attack in
the situation where two decryption exponents share an amount of their most
significant bits. In Section 5, we present the third attack on the Prime Power
RSA when the prime factors share an amount of their most significant bits. We
then conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present some basics on Coppersmith’s method for solving
linear modular polynomial equations and an overview of the continued fraction
algorithm. Both techniques are used in the crafting of our attacks.
First, observe that if N = prq with q < p, then pr+1 > prq = N , and
p > N
1
r+1 . Hence throughout this paper, we will use the inequality p > Nβ
where β = 1r+1 .
2.1 Linear Modular Polynomial Equations
In 1995, Coppersmith [5] developed powerful lattice-based techniques for solving
both modular polynomial diophantine equations with one variable and two vari-
ables. These techniques have been generalized to more variables, and have served
for cryptanalysis of many instances of RSA. More on this can be found in [14,8].
In [7], Herrmann and May presented a method for finding the small roots of a
modular polynomial equation f(x1, . . . , xn) ≡ 0 (mod p) where f(x1, . . . , xn) ∈
Z[x1, . . . , xn] and p is an unknown divisor of a known integer N . Their method
is based on the seminal work of Coppersmith [5]. Very recently, Lu, Zhang and
Lin [12] presented a generalization for finding the small roots of a modular
polynomial equation f(x1, . . . , xn) ≡ 0 (mod pv), where pv is a divisor of some
composite integer N . For the bivariate case, they proved the following result,
which we shall use in the crafting of our attacks.
Theorem 1 (Lu, Zhang and Lin). Let N be a composite integer with a
divisor pu such that p ≥ Nβ for some 0 < β ≤ 1. Let f(x, y) ∈ Z[x, y] be
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a homogenous linear polynomial. Then one can find all the solutions (x, y) of
the equation f(x, y) = 0 mod pv with gcd(x, y) = 1, |x| < Nγ1 , |y| < Nγ2 , in
polynomial time if
γ1 + γ2 < uvβ
2.
2.2 The Continued Fractions Algorithm
We present here the well known result of Legendre on convergents of a continued
fraction expansion of a real number. The details can be found in [6]. Let ξ
be a positive real number. Define ξ0 = ξ and for i = 0, 1, . . . , n, ai = bξic,
ξi+1 = 1/(ξi− ai) unless ξi is an integer. This expands ξ as a continued fraction
in the following form:
ξ = a0 +
1
a1 +
1
. . . +
1
an +
1
. . .
, a0 ∈ N, and ai ∈ N∗ for i ≥ 1,
which is often rewritten as ξ = [a0, a1, . . . , an, . . .]. For i ≥ 0, the rational num-
bers [a0, a1, . . . , ai] are the convergents of ξ. If ξ =
a
b is a rational number, then
ξ = [a0, a1, . . . , an] for some positive integer n, and the continued fraction ex-
pansion of ξ is finite with the total number of convergents being polynomial in
log(b). The following result enables one to determine if a rational number ab is a
convergent of the continued fraction expansion of a real number ξ (see Theorem
184 of [6]).
Theorem 2 (Legendre). Let ξ be a positive real number. Suppose gcd(a, b) = 1
and ∣∣∣ξ − a
b
∣∣∣ < 1
2b2
.
Then ab is one of the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of ξ.
Note that the continued fractions expansion process is polynomial in time.
3 The First Attack on Prime Power RSA with Modulus
N = prq
In this section, we present an attack on the Prime Power RSA when the public
key (N, e) satisfies an equation ex−φ(N)y = z with small parameters x and |z|.
Theorem 3. Let N = prq be a Prime Power RSA modulus and e a public
exponent satisfying the equation ex− φ(N)y = z with y 6≡ 0 (mod pq), 1 < e <
φ(N) and gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1. Then one can factor N in polynomial time if
|xz| < N
r(r−1)
(r+1)2 .
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Proof. Suppose that e < N satisfies an equation ex− φ(N)y = z with |x| < Nδ
and |z| < Nγ . Then, since φ(N) = pr−1(p − 1)(q − 1), we get ex − z ≡ 0
(mod pr−1). Applying Theorem 1 with u = r, v = r − 1 and β = 1r+1 , we can
solve the equation in polynomial time if
δ + γ < uvβ2 =
r(r − 1)
(r + 1)2
,
that is |xz| < N
r(r−1)
(r+1)2 . Since eφ(N) < 1, then, using x and z in the equation
ex− φ(N)y = z, we get for sufficiently large N comparatively to r,
y =
ex− z
φ(N)
<
e|x|
φ(N)
+
|z|
φ(N)
< |x|+ |z| ≤ 1 + |xz| < 1 +N
r(r−1)
(r+1)2 < N.
Hence, when y 6≡ 0 (mod pq), we get
gcd(ex− z,N) = gcd(pr−1(p− 1)(q − 1)y, prq) = g,
with g = pr−1, g = pr or g = pr−1q. If g = pr−1, then p = g
1
r−1 , if g = pr, then
p = g
1
r and if g = pr−1q, then p = Ng . This leads to the factorization of N . uunionsq
Example 1. For r = 2 and N = prq, let us take for N and e the 55 digit numbers
N = 8138044578297117319482018441148072252199996769522371021,
e = 1199995230601021126201343651611107957480251354355883029.
In order to solve the diophantine equation ex−φ(N)y = z, we transformed it
into the equation ex− z ≡ 0 (mod pr−1) using Theorem 3. To be able to apply
Coppersmith’s technique via Theorem 1, we chose the parameters m = 7, t = 6
so that the dimension of constructed the lattice is 36, and X =
[
N
r(r−1)
(r+1)2
]
=
1592999974064. We built the lattice using the polynomial f(x1, x2) = x1 + ex2,
then applied the LLL algorithm [11], and used Gro¨bner basis method to find
the smallest solution x1 = −11537 and x2 = 7053 to f(x1, x2) ≡ 0 (mod pr−1)
in 174 seconds using an off-the-shelf computer. From this solution, we deduced
p = gcd(x1 + ex2, N) = 2294269585934949239, and finally recovered q =
N
p2 =
1546077175000723901. We then computed φ(N) and d ≡ e−1 (mod φ(N)) as
follows:
φ(N) = 8138044578297117310671227668089561946257896925261579800,
d = 2015994747748388772982436393811213317361971865510756269.
Observe that d ≈ N0.98 which is out of range of Sarkar’s bound [16] which can
only retrieve private keys d < N0.395 for r = 2.
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4 The Second Attack on Prime Power RSA using Two
Decryption Exponents
In this section, we present an attack on the Prime Power RSA when two private
exponents d1 and d2 share an amount of their most significant bits, that is
|d1 − d2| is small.
Theorem 4. Let N = prq be an RSA modulus and d1 and d2 be two private
exponents such that e1e2(d1−d2)−(e2−e1) 6≡ 0 (mod N). Then, one can factor
N in polynomial time, if
|d1 − d2| < N
r(r−1)
(r+1)2 .
Proof. Suppose that e1d1 − k1φ(N) = 1 and e2d2 − k2φ(N) = 1 with e1 > e2.
Hence e1d1 ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)) and e2d2 ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)). Multiplying the first
equation by e2 and the second by e1 and subtracting, we get
e1e2(d1 − d2) ≡ e2 − e1 (mod φ(N)).
Since φ(N) = pr−1(p − 1)(q − 1), we get e1e2(d1 − d2) ≡ e2 − e1 (mod pr−1).
Now, consider the modular linear equation
e1e2x− (e2 − e1) ≡ 0 (mod pr−1),
d1 − d2 is a root of such equation. Suppose further that |d1 − d2| < Nδ, then
applying Theorem 1 with u = r, v = r− 1 and β = 1r+1 will lead to the solution
x = d1 − d2 obtained in polynomial time if
δ < uvβ2 =
r(r − 1)
(r + 1)2
.
That is if |d1 − d2| < N
r(r−1)
(r+1)2 . Computing
gcd(e1e2x− (e2 − e1), N) = gcd
(
pr−1(p− 1)(q − 1)y, prq) = g,
and assuming that e1e2(d1−d2)−(e2−e1) 6≡ 0 (mod N) will lead to determining
p, hence factoring N as follows: p = g
1
r−1 when g = pr−1, or p = g
1
r when g = pr,
or p = Ng if g = p
r−1q. uunionsq
Example 2. Let us present an example corresponding to Theorem 4. Consider
N = p2q with
N = 6093253851486120878859471958399737725885946526553626219,
e1 = 2749600381847487389715964767235618802529675855606377411,
e2 = 3575081244952414009316396501512372226545892558898276551.
The polynomial equation is f(x) = e1e2x− (e2− e1) ≡ 0 (mod pr−1), which can
be transformed into g(x) = x− a ≡ 0 (mod pr−1) where a ≡ (e2 − e1)(e1e2)−1
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(mod N). Using m = 8 and t = 6, we built a lattice with dimension ω = 9. Ap-
plying the LLL algorithm [11] and solving the first reduced polynomials, we get
the solution x0 = 1826732340. Hence gcd(f(x0), N) = p = 1789386140116417697
and finally q = Np2 = 1903010275819064491. The whole process took less than
4 seconds using an off-the-shelf computer. Then, using φ(N) = p(p − 1)(q −
1), we retrieved the private exponents d1 ≡ e−11 (mod φ(N)) and d2 ≡ e−12
(mod φ(N)). Note that again d1 ≈ d2 ≈ N0.99 which Sarkar’s method with the
bound d < N0.395 could not possibly retrieve.
5 The Third Attack on Prime Power RSA with Two
RSA Moduli
In this section, we consider two Prime Power RSA moduli N1 = p
r
1q1 and N2 =
pr2q2, where p1 and p2 share an amount of their most significant bits.
Theorem 5. Let N1 = p
r
1q1 and N2 = p
r
2q2 be two RSA moduli with p1 > p2. If
|p1 − p2| < p1
2rq1q2
,
then, one can factor N in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose thatN1 = p
r
1q1 andN2 = p
r
2q2 with p1 > p2. Then q2N1−q1N2 =
q1q2 (p
r
1 − pr2). Hence ∣∣∣∣N2N1 − q2q1
∣∣∣∣ = q1q2 |pr1 − pr2|q21pr1 .
In order to apply Theorem 2, we need that
q1q2|pr1−pr2|
q21p
r
1
< 1
2q21
, or equivalently
|pr1 − pr2| <
pr1
2q1q2
. (1)
Observe that
|pr1 − pr2| = |p1 − p2|
r−1∑
i=0
pr−1−i1 p
i
2 < r|p1 − p2|pr−11 .
Then (1) is fulfilled if r|p1 − p2|pr−11 < p
r
1
2q1q2
, that is if
|p1 − p2| < p1
2rq1q2
.
Under this condition, we get q2q1 among the convergents of the continued fraction
expansion of N2N1 . Using q1 and q2, we get p1 =
(
N1
q1
) 1
r
and p2 =
(
N2
q2
) 1
r
. uunionsq
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Example 3. We present here an example corresponding to Theorem 5. Consider
N1 = p
2
1q1 and N2 = p
2
2q2 with
N1 = 170987233913769420505896917437304719816691353833034482461,
N2 = 120532911819726882881630714003135237766675602824250965921.
We applied the continued fraction algorithm to compute the first 40 convergents
of N2N1 . Every convergent is a candidate for the ratio
q2
q1
of the prime factors. One
of the convergents is 3644368951698789 leading to q2 = 36443689 and q1 = 51698789. This
gives the prime factors p1 and p2
p1 =
√
N1
q1
= 1818618724382942951460443,
p2 =
√
N2
q2
= 1818618724382943035672683.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the Prime Power RSA with modulus N = prq
and public exponent e. We presented three new attacks to factor the modulus
in polynomial time. The first attack can be applied if small parameters x, y and
z satisfying the equation ex− φ(N)y = z can be found . The second attack can
be applied when two private exponents d1 and d2 share an amount of their most
significant bits. The third attack can be applied when two Prime Power RSA
moduli N1 = p
r
1q1 and N2 = p
r
2q2 are such that p1 and p2 share an amount of
their most significant bits.
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